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Abstract 
 
The expected utility approach to decision making advocates a probability vision of the 
world and labels any deviation from it ‘irrational’. This paper reconsiders the 
rationality argument and argues that calculating risks is not a viable strategy in an 
uncertain world. Alternative strategies not only can save considerable cognitive and 
computational resources, but are more ‘rational’ with view to the restricted definition 
of rationality applied by expected utility theorists. The alternative decision making 
model of risk management is presented and explained. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper proposes a model of rational economic behaviour. We employ the general 
definition of rationality. Behaviour is considered rational if the economic actors can 
justify it, i.e. if they can list their reasons for choices made. To clarify what we mean, 
economic actors have some views and theories about the world. We refer to these 
views and theories as knowledge. Note that this knowledge is not required to be 
infallible, i.e. their views and theories may be falsified. Behaviour that is supported by 
knowledge of economic actors can be defined as rational. To this end the proposed 
model will not and cannot be all embracing and explain all economic behaviour. 
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Therefore we do not consider irrational behaviour (contradicting the subjective 
knowledge) or arational behaviour (behaviour that does not directly contradict the 
knowledge, but which is not supported by it either). See Dequech (1997) on the 
classification of rationalities. We do not reject the existence of both irrational and 
arational behaviour and do not maintain that there are mechanisms at work (such as 
markets) that wipe out all behaviour that is not rational, as many rational choice 
theorists do (the 2002 guest speech to the AES is a good example). 
Therefore when we say that (rational) economic behaviour is not possible in the face of 
pure uncertainty what we really mean is that one does not have sufficient knowledge to 
justify any given course of action. This does not mean that any action would be 
impossible, since in the absence of knowledge any admissible course of action would 
not be irrational, but arational.  
The other aim of the proposed model is to obtain descriptive accuracy. Models of 
economic behaviour can be divided into normative and positive ones. Normative 
models are prescriptive in that they prescribe how people should behave in order to fit 
into a pre-defined notion of rationality. That is, normative models say what people 
should do. Positive models on the other hand aim to describe what people actually do.  
The other important element of the proposed model is that it is situated in time. Time 
and its associated uncertainty, ignorance, novelty, surprise and errors are essentially 
the justification for any theory of choice.  
The paper is organised as follows. First, we review some elements of existing models 
of choice considered inappropriate in a model seeking to explain observed patterns of 
economic behaviour. Then we present some elements that are necessary if a model is 
to provide a satisfactory descriptive accuracy. This provides us with a basis for 
explaining the concept of risk management. Finally the application framework of the 
risk management model is presented.  
 
2. What we do not need? 
2.1 Probability calculus 
 
Probability calculus is at the heart of most economic theories of rational choice. It is 
often perceived as synonymous with rational choice. We aim to demonstrate that it is 
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unnecessary in a model of rational choice. The main reason is because in most 
economic situations the use of probability calculus contradicts the definition of 
rationality. The rationality definition applied is a broad one, and if a person has a 
probability view of the world, (as in expected utility theory) then employing 
probability calculus is a rational way of behaving. This however contradicts the much 
narrower definition of rationality imposed by expected utility theories (EUT). For 
simplicity we use the term EUT to denote any theories that employ probability 
calculus in direct or modified form. The EUT model measures everything, including 
rationality with regard to the outcome of a given course of action. In this sense 
rationality in EUT is an outcome based concept. When one includes uncertainty in the 
model, this view becomes difficult to maintain. The rational choice in this context is 
the ‘correct choice’1. It is therefore an ex post concept. Descriptive accuracy in a case 
where the future does not fully correspond to our expectations can only be achieved by 
an ex ante definition of rationality.  
Knight (1921: 234) and Shackle(1950: 71) argue that if the individual does not have 
the ability to often repeat the experiment indefinitely, then since probabilities are 
nothing more than long-run frequency ratios, they are irrelevant to individual 
behaviour. This point deserves detailed explanation. For such a purpose we create a 
new type of economic agent and compare it to the rational economic maximiser. This 
comparison is aimed at demonstrating that the subject of EUT does not fit their own 
definition of rationality. 
The main problem with probability calculus is that its use is based on a rough 
approximation. Let us take as an example the ‘Samuleson’s bet’. This often cited 
example about irrationality in choice is when Samuelson (1963) proposed to a 
colleague the following attractive bet: flip a coin; heads you win $200, tails you lose 
$100. The colleague declined the bet, but declared a willingness to participate in a 
series of 100 such bets. A vast body of literature has been dedicated to this problem 
and to Samuelson’s claim about the irrationality of such a choice (see e.g. Benartzi and 
Thaler, 1999). The main problem of these studies is that they assume the probability 
calculus and overlook the above objection of Knight and Shackle. The apparent 
irrationality vanishes if one considers the problem in the following way. The 
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 “Correct foresight is then not, as it has sometimes been understood, a precondition which must exist in 
order that equilibrium may be arrived at. It is rather the defining character of a state of equilibrium”. 
(Hayek 1937, p. 42). Hayek’s definition is prompted by Morgensterns critique of the use of the perfect 
foresight assumption. 
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probability calculus result of $50 (0.5*200+ 0.5*(-100)) is irrelevant for a one time 
bet. It is an outcome whose probability of occurrence is zero. The only two possible 
outcomes are a loss of $100 or a win of $200 with equal probabilities. If however the 
experiment is repeated for a sufficiently high number of trials, then the probability 
calculus may become relevant. Samuelson’s colleague may have reasoned in the 
following way:  
“If I take a one time bet I am as likely to lose as win. If however the bet is repeated 
many times (e.g 100) then I am much more likely to win than lose and thus it is much 
more advantageous for me to take repeated bets”.  
For a risk averse person, such a choice is clearly rational. The caveat of probability 
calculus reasoning is that it orders the outcomes according to their ’expected’ value 
and tries to get an ’optimal’ solution. ‘Optimality’ is meaningless in a one time bet 
case, because the experience is unique and the probability calculus provides a number 
that is impossible to occur. ‘Optimality’ can only be evaluated ex-post and thus is not 
relevant to problems of ex-ante choices. Note that in this case Samuelson’s colleague 
fits our broad definition of rationality. 
Let us now provide the above case with a more formal analysis. The case of a one-off 
bet has only two possible outcomes: win 200 and a loss of 100. The expected value of 
+50 cannot happen and is not relevant to the decision. Note that the use of the 
expectations operator means implicit reliance on asymptotic limits. In other words if 
we denote the outcome distribution of a bet by Xt , (t=1, 2 … n) and where t is not a 
time operator), then the mathematical expectation is: 
 
)(lim)(
,ktkt
XXE
∞→
=  (1) 
 
Since this is a limiting process for the random variable Xt, its finite sample realisation, 
(i.e. when the number of repetitions is a finite number) will be biased. Therefore, if we 
use CE to define a certainty equivalent, for any finite k, we can write: 
 
CE(Xt,k) = E(Xt) + B(Xt,k) , (2) 
 
where the last term represents the bias.  
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In the one-off bet case we have the bias function consisting of 150 (i.e. 200-50) and –
150 (i.e. –100-50), with equal probabilities of occurrence. Note that not only is the 
mathematical expectation result impossible, but the bias exceeds three times the 
expected value. Let us further define two types of economic agents – the rational EUT 
utility maximiser, who uses probability calculus for making decisions whom we denote 
as homo economicus2 (HE). The other type denoted as homo smarticus (HS)3 will 
avoid probability calculus in most situations (where this is found to be appropriate) 
and its behaviour will be defined in detail below. 
The decision made by a ‘rational’ economic agent or HE, based on mathematical 
expectations assumes that the bias above (equation 2) vanishes. The latter is only true 
at the limit, that is when the experiment is repeated many times. With any finite 
number of repetitions this bias will exist. Therefore what HE does is simplify the 
problem by assuming away this bias. This simplification introduces some error into the 
calculation4. When one has a one-off experiment this error may be significantly large. 
In this way HE cannot be described as a person with a very high IQ. He is rather 
stupid. 
Let us now examine what will happen when an ‘equivalent’, in the sense of probability 
calculus multiple repetitions bet is constructed. This bet could be for example 100 
repetitions of the bet [2, (50%); -1,(50%)]5. The expected value is again +50 units. 
Nevertheless it is not mathematically equivalent to the one-off bet with the same 
expected value. The basic logic is that while for the one-off bet, probability calculus is 
not relevant, in the multiple repetition experiment, subject to individual perception 
with a high number of repetitions, the probabilities become relevant for decision 
making purposes. If one maps the possible outcomes from the multiple bet case, a 
whole range of possible outcomes in the interval [-100,+200] at steps of 3 units 
emerges. In this case in two thirds of these realisations (67 realisations from +2 to 
+200, inclusive) the final outcome is a gain, against only one third (i.e. 33 realisations 
from –100 to –1) realisations of a loss. Clearly for a risk averse person this repetitive 
bet is more advantageous that the one-off bet in which half the realisations were losses. 
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 Intentionally we use the term similar to but different from the widespread homo oeconomicus. 
3
 Note that the initials are the same as for homo sapiens 
4
 In introducing error the rationality of HE contradicts the correctness of the EUT definition., thus HE is 
irrational. 
5
 The original paper (Samuelson, 1963) present the alternative of repetition of the same bet. Since this is 
not equivalent in probability sense and includes complications such as wealth effects, we use this 
formulation instead. 
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Moreover the largest loss (of 100 units) in the repetitive case is much less likely than 
in the one-off bet. Note that even in the repetitive bet, the probability calculus is not 
strictly applicable, because this is still one-off (although repeated 100 times bet). 
Probability calculus would have represented a probability distribution for these 
outcomes with a peak at +50 and an exponentially declining probability mass towards 
the tails. The probabilities will be calculated from the fair coin probabilities of 50:50 
head to tails. Such a representation is based on an approximation. Nevertheless, as the 
number of repetitions increase, the realisations converge towards the limiting 
probability distribution. Therefore for practical reasons, homo smarticus (HS) may 
ignore the relatively small differences from this limiting distribution and consider it 
instead. Every individual HS will have different ideas about how big this number of 
repetitions should be. It will depend on the degree of individual risk aversion and on 
the perceived importance of the decision to be made. What is important however is 
that by doing this, unlike in the HE case, HS is aware that this is an approximation and 
is subject to error. 
With numerous repetitions of the same experiment, the outcomes are distributed onto 
the interval of possible realisations. The bias function is similarly mapped onto the 
interval defined by the biases of the one-off bet. As an illustration the biases 
corresponding to the 100 times repeated bet will fill the interval [-150, +150] (at steps 
of 3 units). In order for HS to apply expected value calculations, two preconditions are 
necessary. First some threshold for the number of repetitions should be exceeded, so 
that HS may decide that probability reasoning applies and the resulting realisation map 
is weighted by these probabilities. Then since the application of this probability 
weighting would also apply to the bias, in order to make a decision, HS would have to 
ignore some realisations for which the probability weighted bias is very small (i.e. 
below some other threshold). In the above example with 100 repetitions this says that 
100 is considered a sufficiently big number (the first threshold), while after ignoring 
some low probability weighted biases, the resulting truncated bias distribution is 
viewed as favourable. Let us assume that HS will accept bets that are viewed as 
(almost) risk free, subject to the above simplification mechanism. This would mean 
that the probability weighted biases for the left 33 realisations (i.e. the negative biases) 
can all be ignored due to their small values (below the second threshold). In this way 
the choice is viewed as a sure bet. There is still an awareness of associated risk in 
terms of probability of a loss, but since this probability is very low, it is ignored. Note 
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that in this example even after the simplification HS is left with the middle third of the 
realisations. Since all these have positive biases, and are to the right of his reference 
point (which was assumed to be zero) then they are acceptable.  
Let us now reconsider how HE makes the choice. He/she derives a certainty equivalent 
by discarding the whole bias distribution (i.e. using the mathematical expectation). 
Sometimes an additional term to account for risk aversion is introduced into the above 
scheme, and the certainty equivalent will be the difference between the expected value 
and this risk aversion adjustment. Note the difference to equation (2), in which due to 
the bias being a random variable, the certainty equivalent itself is a random variable. In 
the mind of HE however, since the bias is ignored, the certainty equivalent is a 
constant. Ignoring the bias is equivalent to assuming that all its non-zero values vanish. 
In the finite case this means that all the probability weighted biases fall below the 
second type of threshold, while the first threshold is zero for HE. It becomes clear that 
HE is an HS, but with an extremely low IQ. Using a very high value for the second 
threshold is designed to maximally simplify the problem, so that there is no room for 
real choice. HE evidently cannot be trusted to make the choice on its own. Note that 
the role of the adjustment for risk aversion plays the same role as the reference point 
(to cut off favourable from unfavourable outcomes) and this is the only place for 
individuality (i.e. intelligence) in HE. Furthermore by using a threshold of zero for the 
application of probability calculus, HE ignores the bias and thus is less intelligent than 
HS who in the one-off choice does not ignore any part of the bias (only a part of the 
bias is ignored and only in multiple repetitions bets). If we assume that the reference 
point for HE in the one-off bet example is zero (which means that he/she also has a 
risk aversion adjustment of zero) then this bet will be accepted, because of its positive 
expected value. In making this choice however the 50% probability of a loss of 100 
units is implicitly ignored. Compared to an HS with the same reference point, HE is 
much less risk averse. Lets us now consider the case where they have the same risk 
aversion in the one-off bet case. For this comparison the reference point for HS is 
again zero and thus he will decline this bet. Then in order for HE to decline the bet, 
his/her risk aversion adjustment should be more than 100 units. Then since this is the 
same person and this is equivalent in terms of the probability calculus bet, in the 
repetitive case, the same risk aversion adjustment should apply and this bet should also 
be declined. This is essentially the argument Samuelson made. Let us now take the last 
bet and repeat it one million times and for simplicity no money exchanges hands 
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before the last repetitions (we introduce this condition to escape the wealth effect of 
the Saint Petersburg paradox). For HE this is still the same type of bet and should be 
declined. For HS however this is a virtually risk-free way of making money and he/she 
will accept such an offer. What are the implications of this example? Surprisingly, it 
leads to another standard ‘rationality’ argument, the one about how HE will wipe out 
all quasi rational economic actors, via its ‘superior’ calculative properties. Since the 
world in which we live is a unique one, there is limited scope for probability calculus 
application. Therefore by designing appropriate repetitive gambles, HS can exploit the 
myopia of HE with regard to the differences between one-off and repeated bets. Then 
it will be homo economicus who will be wiped out in the market place, not the quasi 
rational HS. An interesting point is that the ‘standard’ argument about how HE can 
exploit non-rational economic actors does not apply to HS. The way in which such 
gambles are constructed is by exploiting some argument about consistent preferences. 
In the expected utility sense however the preferences of HS are not consistent in terms 
of expected utility theory. Therefore he/she cannot be fooled into participating in such 
gambles6. Only a person with consistent preferences (such as HE) can be involved in 
such machinations. Let us now consider the theorem that Samuelson proved about the 
irrationality of his colleague. The argument is very simple induction. Let us repeat it 
for HS. If he has played the gamble described above 99 times, and then asked for 
another round, he should decline, according to his elicited preferences. This condition 
assumes unchanging preferences and is extremely restrictive. Whether this additional 
bet will be accepted in the case of HS depends on the outcome of the previous 99, in 
the lines of ‘mental accounting’. Nevertheless, let us assume unchanging preferences. 
Then, as Samuelson stated, if asked after 98 bets, his colleague, should decline and so 
on until realising that it is not worth beginning the sequence. Now let us look at this 
argument from HS’s perspective. What will, (assuming non changing preferences) he 
do after 99 bets? It depends on the view of HS about the threshold of repetitions above 
which the probability calculus applies. If this threshold is 100, he/she will only accept 
ab ovo bets which are repeated at least 100 times. Therefore before beginning the first 
round, he/she will be aware that the bets should be repeated at least 100 times. Then it 
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 The way these money pumping schemes are presented is usually as follows: HE goes to the quasi 
rational agent and says: “you accept gamble A and reject gamble B, then you should also accept gamble 
C (which I constructed), because it is constructed according to your preferences. Let’s play.” This does 
not apply if the quasi rational agent does not think in the same way and cannot be convinced by this line 
of reasoning. 
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follows that 100 is a watershed for this person. If asked after the 100 bet, he should 
decline an additional bet, because its marginal contribution is the same as a one-off 
bet. If however asked before the 100 bet, then in principle the additional bet should be 
accepted in order to exceed the threshold. Note however that what HS would normally 
do is to get an agreement about the number of bets beforehand and in this way refute 
the above type of recursive argument. The mistake Samuelson and other expected 
utility analysts make is that they see a 100 repetitions of the same bet simply as a 
collection of individual bets and not as an ensemble. 
If asked after some number of repetitions about whether to stop betting here, then the 
answer of a typical HS should depend on the outcome from betting up to this point. 
He/she has the reassurance that betting will continue until the predetermined number 
of bets. The choice of whether or not to continue depends on several factors. First can 
the remaining number of bets be considered an ensemble (i.e. do their number exceed 
the threshold which he/she has set up applying probability calculus arguments?). 
Second what is actually proposed; an additional bet or a number of additional bets? 
Thirdly, what is the outcome from betting so far and how it may be altered by 
accepting additional number of bets? The only thing that Samuelson’s argument 
proves is that his colleague’s choice (and similarly HS choices) is inconsistent with 
expected utility theory. It would nevertheless be a mistake to generalise such a finding 
to that one of the two choices in irrational (as Berhartzi and Thaler (1999) and others 
do). It would have been the case only if these two gambles were equivalent. They are 
not and thus there is no contradiction in the choices HS makes. 
Homo smarticus is a mythological creature, no more real than homo economicus, and 
the above discussion only aimed at proving the irrelevance and irrationality of 
ubiquitous use of probability calculus in ‘explaining’ economic choices. 
 
2.2 Preferences 
 
Preferences (like probability calculus) are another taboo in economic choice theories. 
They are defined in an almost tautological way: Everybody (economic agents) 
maximises something (utility function).7 This assertion cannot be falsified. It has 
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 Boland (1992) argues that the above should be considered metaphysics instead of tautology. 
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anecdotal significance in economics, from Pareto’s assertion that “the individual can 
disappear, provided he leaves us this photograph of his preferences (Pareto, 1971: 720) 
to Boulding’s (1978) ‘Immaculate Conception of the Indifference Curve’. It however 
is an ex-post concept. Preference orderings are defined over the outcomes of the 
decisions. It this way preferences are better though of as justification of already made 
decisions, rather then premises for choice (March, 1978). When there is uncertainty, 
then the outcomes and thus the preferences cannot be fully, but only partially, ordered 
(Kornai, 1971). The full ordering of preferences (together with their stability over 
time) is however a cornerstone in the EUT axiomatic approach to decision making.  
How this becomes a problem in a descriptive model of decision making? Let us look at 
one of the numerous ‘anomalies’8 of decision making, the so called ‘dominance 
effect’. It is expressed in psychological experiments as below. When people are 
presented with the following type of choices: (A) a holiday in London for £500, (B) a 
holiday in Paris for £500, (C) a holiday in London for £600, all the above options with 
the same duration of the holidays, most of them choose option (A). When on the other 
hand they are presented with the options: (D) holiday in Paris for £500, (E) holiday in 
London for £500, (F) holiday in Paris for £600, they chose D. It is argued that this is 
an inconsistent choice because according to the first choice they should prefer (A) to 
(B), but the second choice ‘reveals the opposite preference (since (A) and (E) and also 
(B) and (D) are identical). This led ‘dominance’ effect is however perfectly rational 
once one takes into account the possibility for structural uncertainty and risk aversion. 
Let us assume that people do not know the relative cost of holidays in London and 
Paris (which would have allowed them to directly compare them). This assumption 
makes sense once one takes into account that the normal setting for such an experiment 
may be an American university and the subjects are students, who did not had the 
chance to visit both London and Paris. In this case in the first choice they would not 
know how exactly option (B) compares with (A) and (C). What they know for sure is 
that (A) clearly dominates (C). With the uncertainty where exactly (B) is to be ranked, 
(A) is a very attractive choice. It is at least the second best. If one chooses (B) instead, 
given the total uncertainty, there is two thirds of chance to choose a worse option. 
Therefore unless one has some additional knowledge about how these two options 
compare, the choice of (A) is a rational one for any risk averse person. Similarly one 
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may consider the second choice. The mistake one may make in comparing these two 
choices is to state that they reveal some kind of preference. Preferences cannot be 
formed with regard to uncertain alternatives9. One may not prefer (A) to (B) without 
knowing something about both (A) and (B). Therefore in an uncertain setting, choices 
“ …do not elicit pure statements of preference” (Manski, 1999). It is however clear 
that the world in which we live and make decisions in is an uncertain one. Hence 
preferences cannot explain our rational choices. 
 
3. What do we need in a model of rational choice? 
3.1 A reference point 
The reference point divides perceived outcomes into favourable (gains) and 
detrimental ones (losses). It is now an established part of economic decision theories. 
It is used in the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), cumulative prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1992)10, although the earlier value function of 
Markowitz (1952) exhibits the same characteristics and Shackle’s (1949) potential 
surprise curve allows for such asymmetries. It is widely accepted that there is a 
fundamental asymmetry in perception of advantageous (gains) and disadvantageous 
outcomes (losses). These are seen and acted upon in a different way. The reference 
point concept presents an insurmountable challenge to normative theories. As Arrow 
(1951) objected when commenting on Shackle’s theories, this makes choice contingent 
on individual interpretative frameworks and thus makes a normative model of choice 
inapplicable. To put this explicitly we use the following extensive citation: 
“Indeed, the failures of description invariance (framing effects) and the 
procedure invariance (elicitation effects) pose a greater problem for rational 
choice models than the failure of specific axioms, such as independence or 
transitivity, and they demand descriptive models of much greater complexity. 
Violations of descriptive invariance require an explicit treatment of the 
framing process, which precedes the evaluation of prospects (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979). Violations of procedural invariance require context-
                                                                                                                                                                            
8
 This term is usually used since they define clear violations of EUT. This does not necessarily mean 
that there is something abnormal. 
9
 Preferences refer to outcomes, not the alternatives. 
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dependent models (for example Tversky et al., 1988) in which the weighting 
of attributes is contingent on the method of elicitation. These developments 
highlight the discrepancy between the normative and the descriptive 
approaches to decision making which many choice theorists (see Mark 
Machina, 1987) have tried to reconcile. Because invariance, unlike 
independence or even transitivity – is normatively unassailable and 
descriptively incorrect, it does not seem possible to construct a theory of 
choice that is both normatively acceptable and descriptively accurate” 
(Tversky et al. 1990: 215). 
Since both the framing and the elicitation effects invoke different reference points, the 
above states that this concept is incompatible with normative choice theorising. It is 
nevertheless a useful concept for a number of reasons. First, it captures the public 
perception of risk. The colloquial meaning of risk invokes an idea about unfavourable 
consequences that one needs to try to avoid. It would be very unreasonable, on the 
other hand to try to avoid one’s exposure to consequences perceived to be 
advantageous (i.e. gains). This split of consequences into two qualitative categories, 
provides a major tool of calculation, namely comparison. One should be aware that 
rational calculation may assume numerous forms and probability calculus is just one of 
these (Kostov and Lingard, 2003). Comparison is the easiest (in terms of application 
and resource requirements) form of calculation, and its application in an uncertain 
world should exceed the application of any other calculation tool. The reference point 
concept, and this is the main worry for normative choice theorists, moves us away 
from the ‘objective’ view of the decision problem. To clarify the latter point we 
consider the psychological literature on the ‘overconfidence effect’. Suppose one is 
asked questions of the type: 
Which of these countries has the lowest per capita GDP?  
A) Malaysia, B) Kenya, C)Hungary, D)Peru, 
with the additional requirement to provide a percentage figure to show how confident 
one is in the answer. The typical finding of such experiments is that when the answers 
are aggregated an ‘overconfidence’ effect arises in that the declared level of 
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 The prospect theory is sometimes presented as a positive decision making theory. It introduces 
mechanisms for translation of objective data into subjective ‘facts’. Nevertheless it retains the 
applicability of the probability calculus to the tranformed problem. 
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confidence exceeds the percentage of right answers. The probability calibration 
psychology models present an explanation for the above effect. It can be formally 
proved (e.g. Juslin and Olsson,1999) then when people associate the questions with 
some mental ‘clues’ and use the latter to formulate their answers, the paradox of 
overconfidence vanishes. To clarify, let us assume that one does not know the answer 
to the question. Let us further assume that one knows however that Malaysia is an 
Asian country, Kenya is in Africa, Hungary in Eastern Europe and Peru in Latin 
America. Then one may reason in the following way: since the per capita GDP is a 
measure of wealth (poverty), Kenya as an African country is most likely to be the 
poorest one. The probability calibration models prove that the final results from such 
experiments are consistent with the probabilities associated with these mental clues, 
i.e. the confidence levels expressed are consistent with the objective probabilities of an 
African country being poorer than a country from other continents. We note that 
although such a model will require one to know these objective probabilities, it 
provides some important conclusions. Choices are made in conditions of uncertainty 
and ignorance (people are aware of this ignorance). In such situations one needs 
something to anchor one’s decision to. The reference point is one example for such 
orientation device. 
 
3.2 An image of the decision problem 
With a view to environmental uncertainty and the dependence of the decision on the 
way it is perceived, it becomes clear that this is a necessary part of any model that aims 
at descriptive accuracy. This perception is highly subjective and an implication of this 
is that there can be no universal normative model, simply because the same decision 
problem may be perceived differently by different people. It has been argued that 
“most cognitive anomalies operate through errors in perception”. (McFadden, 1999), 
but while some normative theorists see their mission to eliminate such errors, we 
maintain that not only these systematic ’errors’ need to be studied and incorporated in 
decision making theories (McFadden, 1999), but since their definition as errors 
depends on the EUT definition of rationality, they may still be rational adaptations to 
an uncertain environment.  
Due to the important influence of the individual interpretative frameworks, it is 
advantageous to translate the decision problem into the subjective reality of the 
  14 
decision maker (Teigen and Brun, 1997; Kostov and Lingard, 2001, 2002). One can 
both account for perception ‘errors’, and map the individual knowledge relevant to the 
decision problem. Returning to the earlier example about HE and HS, these two 
decision makers have totally different word views and their different perceptions 
makes them act differently. Knowing the premises of their choices, i.e. their world 
views and the way they process the available data, can help us to determine what their 
choices might be. The process of translating objective into subjective reality involves 
extensive use of different reference points (to define what one wants to avoid) and 
mental comparisons. The long history of psychological experiments finding violations 
to basic principles of probability calculus has led to a consensus that people do not 
handle probabilities well. They however improve a lot their ‘rationality’ with regard to 
probabilities when they are given another comparable set of probabilities, for example 
when the probabilities for a chemical leak are presented alongside the probabilities of 
comparable events, e.g. a road accident (Kunreuther et al., 2001). This means that the 
most likely way probabilities are to be incorporated in decision making is by simple 
comparison. This is also the easiest and a very efficient way to use them given 
important restrictions on time and computational resources. The comparison provides a 
measure for the (perceived) significance of given probabilities and allows simple 
dominances to be distinguished, thus creating possibilities for problem simplification 
(by excluding from consideration all dominated alternatives). Note that the reference 
point discussed earlier is also a comparison device. It may be alternatively defined by 
using the no change or ‘carry on’ scenario. This would evaluate the likely 
consequences from making some decision against the status quo (i.e. the likely result if 
this decision is not made). This can explain the ‘wealth’ effects in expected utility 
models, because this is an additional way to incorporate part of the status quo. This 
leads to a conclusion that decisions should be evaluated with regard to the marginal 
changes they are likely to bring, not in principle. This is an important point because 
such a comparison allows one to use the same interpretative framework for sequences 
of decisions. In spite of the marginalist philosophy behind the concept, it also leads to 
anchoring individual choices to individual perceptions, and moving away from the 
normative models of choice. The role of individual knowledge is very similar to the 
role it has in mental accounting theories, particularly the problem of choice bracketing 
(Read et al., 1999), where individuals integrate or segregate the consequences of 
different decisions, and this leads to different, not beforehand determined choices. 
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3.3 Decisions are dynamic 
 
Making a decision involves evaluation of its uncertain outcomes. EUT uses 
mathematical expectations to project this future uncertainty into the present (and thus 
makes an inadmissible simplifying assumption about the non-existence of uncertainty 
expressed by the bias term in equation (2)). Such a treatment essentially makes the 
problem static by excluding from it all dynamic elements It is a product of a simplistic 
deterministic vision, in which time has no place or role (Kostov and Lingard, 2001). 
Decision making however is a dynamic process. We have a ‘feeling’ of time and 
awareness of our ignorance. Therefore when making decisions one acts upon this 
awareness. The existence of such awareness means that we are smart enough not to 
engage in endless and meaningless probability calculations, but try to obtain a more 
tractable problem by appropriately simplifying it. This simplification is imperfect in 
that the tools involved may distort objective reality. Nevertheless they are workable 
adaptations to a highly uncertain environment. There is more to this awareness that the 
possibility of errors. As dynamic programming demonstrates, any deviation from the 
assumed optimal path changes the nature of the problem itself. When we say that 
decision making is dynamic, we mean that there is an awareness that the decisions are 
interrelated and that they change future decision problems. One should have a flexible 
(i.e. modifiable) view of how things function. Decision making is also a complex 
process in the sense that it is difficult to grasp what information the decision maker 
will deem important. A basic premise of much psychological research is to isolate 
some effect by locally purifying the decision context. This means that subjects in such 
experiments are assumed to use the information provided and only the information 
provided. As our explanation of the dominance effect shows however, decision always 
takes place in the context of individual knowledge (or ignorance) and experiences. 
Even in simplistic experiments the context emerges, it is thus necessary to concentrate 
our modes of explanation on the process characteristics of the decision making. In this 
way the decision context specific to each decision maker will find its natural place. 
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4. Risk management 
 
The risk management model discussed below, fits the requirements for descriptive 
accuracy outlined in previous sections. 
“Risk management is a process of simplifying the decision problem aimed at 
restructuring it in such a way that the risk (the subjective perception of the 
environmental uncertainty) is excluded”. (Kostov and Lingard, 2003). 
It is important to stress a distinction between uncertainty and risk in the risk 
management framework. Uncertainty is viewed as an objective characteristic of the 
environment, while risk is its subjective perception. In this light both risk and 
uncertainty may be unstructured and radical. For more details on the above distinction 
and its derivation see Kostov and Lingard (2001). In this framework there many 
different forms of calculation which transform the decision problem. Unlike the EUT 
stance of universal application of probability calculus, in the risk management 
perspective, probability calculus is one of the less important calculation tools. 
Comparison is more widely used. The main device for extracting risk out of the 
decision problem are the risk defusing operators. The decision process in terms of risk 
management initially simplifies the problem by the use of such risk operators. The aim 
is to extract as much risk as possible. Ideally one will want a transformed problem that 
is (perceived as) risk free so that a straightforward decision criteria can be applied. 
Only when this cannot be achieved is there place for some ‘trading’ of different 
characteristics of the problem in the final choice. The process however does not stop 
there. When a decision is deemed important, it prompts post decision consolidation 
processes which further modify the subjective reality so that the made decision is 
evaluated favourably.  
The risk defusing operators can be broadly classified into four main types (Huber, 
1997): control, new alternatives, precautions and worst case operators. We only briefly 
review these with regard to the desirable decision model components outlined. 
Control is the most important, though most requiring in terms of resource use, risk 
operator. It is expressed in an appropriate transformation of the decision problem in 
such a way that its characteristics are altered in an advantageous direction. In order to 
use control operators however, one needs a mental ‘image’ of how the environment 
changes. A structural and procedural knowledge about the problem is necessary. With 
regard to this, the use of control operators is related to the concept of associative 
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learning11. Therefore the use of the control operator implies a clear ‘mental image’ of 
the problem. Furthermore since its aim is to ‘improve’ the characteristics of the initial 
problem by moving it is a more favourable direction, it also needs a reference point, 
i.e. some distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ outcomes, i.e. gains and losses. 
Unlike the conventional subjective utility story of well defined and exhaustive 
characterisation of the problem, we are often aware of our ignorance. The new 
alternatives operator transforms ignorance into knowledge. Our awareness of risk 
exposure is coupled with an awareness of ignorance. While new alternatives operators 
decrease this ignorance, it does not disappear. The new alternatives operator only 
exists at the edge of time. Once we step into tomorrow the novelty of today disappears 
and the new alternatives operator is transformed into another type of risk operator. By 
explicitly distinguishing it as a separate operator we pursue several aims. First this 
emphasises that decision makers are aware of their ignorance and are actively seeking 
to improve their knowledge. While the only such activity available to rational 
optimisers (such as the expected utility calculator HE) is simple information gathering 
(which may perversely increase their risk), the new alternatives operator requires 
structural learning in the sense that economic actors learn and discover the structure of 
the problem ( which is known in EUT problems)12. By situating a risk operator 
explicitly in the present, we stress the link between individual knowledge (based in the 
past) and the outcomes of the decision (which will happen in the future). These 
however are not conflated into each other as in an EUT-like treatment of the decision 
problem. Another important implication of the new alternatives operator is the 
possibility to impact on the interpretative frameworks of the decision makers. This is 
actually one of the aims of this operator. One needs awareness of one’s ignorance and 
the potential fallibility of one’s knowledge in order to contemplate the use of such an 
operator. 
Precautions operators transfer risk outside the problem by transferring them to 
somebody else, like insurance, or by preventing their unfavourable consequences 
occurring. The second type of precautions operator looks similar to the control 
                                                           
11
 In contrast to reinforcement learning, where the problem image does not change, associative learning 
allows for changes in economic actor’s ‘theories’. 
12
 There is a vast literature on ambiguity (essentially assuming a known structure of the problem, but 
with unknown probability distribution). This literature and its associated quantitative tools (MaxMin 
criterion, Choquet integral) exclude from the outset the possibility of the structural character of the 
uncertainty. The learning in this context is nothing else than information gathering and probabilities 
discovery. 
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operator. The difference is that the control operator uses the interpretation of how 
things function in order to prevent occurrence of some unfavourable consequences, 
whilst the precautions operator is used without a view to altering the outcomes, but 
simply taking measures to offset their consequences. This represents ‘delegation’ of 
responsibility for some aspects of the problem to someone else, and may lead to 
perverse results. Nevertheless, it is a way to simplify the problem. Decision makers 
have limited resources and cannot cope with all perceived risks (or are unwilling to do 
so). The precautions operator eliminates risks (they disappear from the subjective 
reality). 
If risks are perceived as significantly small we can ignore them, and act as if they do 
not exist. This thresholding of risk is a prerequisite of action, and represents a built-in 
mechanism of altering the subjective reality. This mechanism extends far beyond 
ignoring risks because of their magnitude, but also applies to ignoring information 
deemed to be irrelevant to the problem We consider this a feature of the subjective 
interpretation of the problem. Akerlof and Dickens (1982) show how one would 
choose to ignore certain risks, i.e. to select a belief system and ignore crucial 
information. This is another important difference to the normative approach where all 
data is equivalent and is fully processed to get an optimal decision. In psychology the 
value dependence of decision making is long established.  
In some cases defusing all the risk, even with the use of a level of risk tolerance may 
not be possible. In such circumstances one would use the least risky known alternative. 
The worst-case plan operator is used so that risk exposure is minimised. It does not 
resemble a ‘risk free’ choice, but is the second best. Nevertheless the implication of the 
use of a worst case plans operator is similar to the use of other operators. Although 
there is awareness of the existence of risk in the transformed problem, decision can be 
made, as if it did not exist. 
 
5. Rediscovering risk management in agriculture, food and rural development 
 
We give some examples on this where risk management practices can be found. The 
purpose of this exposition of examples of use of risk management operators is to 
clarify the concepts discussed. The general applicability of risk management to the 
problems of rural development is discussed in Kostov and Lingard (2002), while a 
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more detailed operational research agenda within this framework is presented in 
Kostov and Lingard (2003). 
Let us consider the use of agro-chemicals in agricultural production. These are a way 
to increase yields, and ‘quality’ of the final product. The latter term is in quotation 
marks because the meaning of improved quality in this context refers mainly to 
improved appearance. This is achieved by reducing the influence of pests and diseases. 
Therefore the use of chemicals represents an control operator which has a positive 
impact on the ‘quality’. This effects is achieved through the knowledge of how specific 
chemicals will influence yields, taste and product appearance. The other side of the 
story is that chemical residues can accumulate in the final food product. This is 
nowadays perceived as a ‘bad’, and thus the ‘quality’ is reduced. Quality in the latter 
context is interpreted in terms of how ‘healthy’ and ‘safe’ the product is. Therefore this 
control operator only worked well until the categorisation of the outcomes changed.  
Organic farming is also based on the use of control operators. It claims to prevent 
some unfavourable consequences of commercial farming by certification and other 
measures. Certification in itself does not make a product organic. It gives assurances to 
the consumer that the product is organic. In this way, certification impacts on 
consumers’ translation of objective into subjective reality. The knowledge element is 
that organic is interpreted (by these consumers who look for organic products) as a 
proxy for ‘healthy’, ‘safer’, ‘better quality’ and in this way less risky. The reduced risk 
in the minds of environmentally friendly consumers justifies a price premium. 
Agriculture before its commercial era was in principle organic. The control has led to 
two opposite tendencies. The difference is, the perception of what is good and bad, and 
therefore risk.  
Building a waste processing plant, which is an example of a precaution operator, does 
not prevent the incidence of polluting waste, but takes care to reduce or eliminate the 
consequences, that is, the pollution itself, after they have occurred. Whilst in active 
risk operators (control and new alternatives) the decision makers assumes 
responsibility for the decision and try their best to make the best possible choice. 
Using a passive operator, such as precautions, transfers the responsibility for the 
outcome to someone else. The effects of such ‘delegation’ of responsibility may be 
negative. For example the effect of food safety regulations has been found (Viscusi, 
1985) to be unable to restrict cases of food poisoning. The explanation of such a 
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paradox is simple. When people rely on food safety regulations to prevent this 
unwanted outcome (food poisoning) they reduce their own efforts to do it (i.e. the use 
of control operators such as avoiding some foods or food outlets). This offsets the 
positive influence of the regulation. Similar arguments may be developed with regard 
to car safety regulations (Peltzman, 1975). 
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